The way forward in Lebanon

The election of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam is a political breakthrough in Lebanon and a harbinger of what could happen in a country long dismissed as unsalvageable. Beirut’s new leadership reflects the aspiration of a majority of the Lebanese people to live in a functioning state free from the dual drivers of its failure: political violence and pervasive corruption. Those leaders must now deliver on their commitment to establish a state committed and accountable to its people and rise to meet the responsibility that comes with holding the promise of a nation’s future.

The success of two back-to-back elections that can rewrite Lebanon’s story is no accident — it is a testament to what is possible when local agency and international resolve converge to circumvent spoilers and seize the moment. Yet neither Lebanon’s success nor failure are guaranteed. Its future will not be determined by a changing of the guard alone but rather by the resolve to confront its existential crises. Upon forming a credible and capable government, a task that has yet to be achieved, the new leadership in Beirut will only succeed if it — with the support of Washington and its partners — prioritizes three interlocking objectives. First, it must fully implement the recently extended cease-fire agreement with Israel and uphold past United Nations resolutions mandating Hezbollah’s disarmament. Second, it must heal the wounds of war by rebuilding lost homes and businesses, aiding the displaced, and ensuring those most affected are not left behind. Third, Lebanon must implement reforms to fix its public institutions and services, revive its economy, and restore the trust of its people both at home and abroad.

While policymakers in global and regional capitals may have bitter memories of hopes raised and dashed in Lebanon, they cannot afford to overlook this country’s potential or the promising circumstances that have emerged there following Hezbollah and Iran’s strategic losses across the Levant. Nor can Lebanon’s new leadership take that domestic or international support for granted. By combining pressure on spoilers with robust support for a new leadership in Beirut to take the difficult but necessary decisions needed to restore the integrity of the Lebanese state, Washington and its partners can enable the conditions for Lebanon to succeed. Securing a reliable partner in the Lebanese state — a goal well within reach — is instrumental to burying Iran’s destabilizing regional agenda for good and ushering in a new chapter for the region defined by credible states, functional economies, and respected borders. But Lebanon’s new leadership must prove its credibility as a trusted partner — both to its citizens, in desperate need of change, and to the international partners it seeks life-saving assistance from — by forming a capable government and pursuing a bold vision focused on dismantling Hezbollah’s grip and the status quo that deliberately dragged the country into war and ruin, before these spoilers hijack Lebanon’s future once again.

President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam

The elections of President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, on Jan. 9 and 13, respectively, have ignited cautious but unmistakable optimism in Lebanon. As the war between Hezbollah and Israel dragged on for over a year, Lebanon was led by a caretaker government. That leadership void has now been filled by two figures with the potential to prove themselves as statesmen.

As head of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), Aoun played a leading role in the fight against ISIS in 2017, held the army together throughout the country’s protracted economic crisis that thrust many uniformed personnel into poverty, and more recently, oversaw the historic deployment of the LAF to South Lebanon in accordance with the new cease-fire agreement. The LAF’s role in securing the Beirut airport throughout the war and combatting narco-trafficking strengthened Aoun’s image with international partners as a figure willing and able to take on Lebanon’s pressing security challenges. Though these successes speak to his potential as a credible statesman, he is no strongman. For many Lebanese, he is also respected for his refusal to crack down on protesters during the 2019 nationwide demonstrations against Lebanon’s dysfunctional political establishment. Together with the backing of the LAF, one of the few institutions retaining broad support across Lebanon’s diverse landscape, Aoun’s profile suggests a figure that is strong enough to stand up to spoilers and address the difficult security challenges ahead without infringing on Lebanon’s democratic values or fracturing the country’s fragile communal character.

Salam’s record suggests a different yet essential complement to Aoun’s security credentials: a commitment to the rule of law and the vision of a reformer. As a former judge for the International Court of Justice and ambassador to the UN, Salam has a solid reputation and strong relationships with diplomats across the world. His work as Lebanon’s ambassador to the UN, where he served as president of the United Nations Security Council, and his participation in the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon that identified Hezbollah’s role in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri demonstrate a readiness to confront the formidable forces undermining the Lebanese state. Salam is also an academic whose past work on reform earned widespread trust and respect from the country’s well-organized civil society and the broader public. His election empowers a head of government prepared to rebuild trust in Lebanon’s failing institutions, restore the rule of law, and center accountability and transparency in the struggle to build a functioning state.

Together, Aoun and Salam possess the skills, experience, and fortitude required to stand up to the spoilers and vested interests that have doomed Lebanon to endless cycles of violence and state failure. If backed with the right support and held accountable to their stated commitments to reform and sovereignty, both have the potential to serve as decisive leaders capable of taking the steps needed for Lebanon to succeed.

Local agency meets international support

These breakthrough victories for proponents of the Lebanese state offer lessons learned for how local agency, timing, and strategic international support can work together to counterbalance spoilers and prevail over dysfunction.

The presidency: How international support can tilt the scales

Hezbollah’s unprecedented losses following the elimination of its leadership and significant degrading of its arsenal, along with the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, accelerated the election of two candidates outside the organization’s sphere of influence.

The first sign of Hezbollah’s weakness was apparent when Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, a Hezbollah ally, scheduled a presidential election soon after a cease-fire agreement was struck. A day before the scheduled vote, Suleiman Frangieh, a Hezbollah-backed candidate and Assad ally, withdrew his candidacy and backed Aoun. Still, the outcome of the election was far from sealed. While Frangieh’s withdrawal and the holding of elections signaled Hezbollah’s waning influence, it remained unclear whether the group would still obstruct the election of a president and prolong the presidential vacuum in the face of mounting local and international pressure. Aoun’s candidacy faced particular challenges. Opponents argued that as head of the LAF and a civil servant, his election would require a two-thirds majority of the 128 members of parliament — the quorum reserved to amend the constitution if needed. The United States, Saudi Arabia, and France — all members of the Quintet Committee — had dispatched their envoys to firmly back Aoun. While Hezbollah withheld its support in the first round of voting, Aoun secured 99 votes by the second, including votes from Hezbollah and well above the threshold. Hezbollah’s attempt to frame its withholding of votes in the first round as a signal that the election could not proceed without its blessing ultimately fell flat. A convergence of factors — coordinated and firm international resolve, Hezbollah’s diminishing influence, concerns of a more confrontational candidate likely succeeding in the future, and pressing reconstruction needs — tilted the scales in favor of a candidate outside its sphere of influence. President Aoun’s inaugural speech pledging to secure the state’s full authority over its borders and ports, maintain a monopoly on the use of force, uphold the rule of law, and drive deep reforms marked a decisive blow to Hezbollah’s narrative and highlighted its weakening hand.

The premiership: Local agency and a new momentum

Following Aoun’s nationalist speech, which created evident discomfort among Hezbollah parliamentarians as he promised to reassert the state’s monopoly on force, all eyes were on the contest over the premiership. Would Hezbollah swallow the setback in exchange for a quid-pro-quo whereby its ally, caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati, would lead a new government? Initially, a seemingly fractured opposition — split between traditional blocs and alternative members of parliament that emerged after the 2022 elections — appeared unable to rally behind a single candidate. Mikati’s election looked all but certain; but mounting public pressure and behind-the-scenes negotiations within the opposition produced a breakthrough. Hezbollah sought to delay the process, announcing it would submit its votes the following day. Aoun, in his first major test of leadership, insisted that all votes be cast as scheduled. By the day’s end, Salam secured 88 votes, an absolute majority. Hezbollah and its chief Shi’a ally, the Amal Movement, abstained rather than support a candidate that already lost, allowing them to accuse their opponents of excluding them and their constituents.

When unable to achieve its objectives through democratic processes, Hezbollah has historically resorted to a combination of targeted assassinations and unconstitutional tactics, including boycotts backed by the threat of armed force, to obstruct the government formation process and impose its agenda. While Hezbollah and Amal will likely resort to strategic ambiguity or bluffing in an attempt to secure key cabinet positions, even here their old playbook is losing its edge. After years of obstruction, Hezbollah’s collective concessions are not signals of goodwill; rather, they reveal its weakened hand and need for a government that can secure international backing to rebuild the country. As Speaker Berri conceded on the question of the government’s formation: “Lebanon must move forward.” But following Hezbollah’s significant setbacks, its most effective tool stems from the potential weakness of its rivals. By invoking the specter of civil war or the country’s fractured history to justify its inclusion in key cabinet positions and strategic decision-making more broadly, it manufactures a false consensus — one that grants it free rein to advance its agenda, and that of its Iranian patron, over the sovereignty of the Lebanese state and the reforms needed to revive its battered economy.

The only true way forward is by breaking free from Hezbollah’s grasp. And the country’s new leaders hold the promise of rising to the occasion as true statesmen; but leadership is not defined by potential — it is earned through decisive action. To lead Lebanon into a new era, they need to form a government that can make the hard choices: restore sovereignty, confront vested interests, and prioritize the Lebanese state above all else. As Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud put it, “We will need to see real action, we will need to see real reform, we will need to see a commitment to a Lebanon that is looking to the future, not to the past, in order for us to raise our engagement.” Though there are elements that still signal promise, that leadership has yet to be firmly demonstrated; until it does, the original optimism their election inspired will continue to erode.

If ever there was an opportune environment to confront spoilers, it is now. The most telling indicator of the emerging political realities in Lebanon could be seen in the election of Prime Minister Salam. Whereas Saudi Arabia and the US invested strategic diplomatic capital in the outcome of the presidential election, the premiership was won by changes in the different parliamentary blocs’ internal calculations reflecting Hezbollah’s reduced capacities and ability to project power. To put things in perspective, Hezbollah has already lost the majority of its arsenal, with intelligence estimates of losses as high as 50% during the conflict to 80% by its end. The collapse of the Assad regime has also significantly undermined Iran’s ability to sustainably regroup and rearm Hezbollah, as it did after the 2006 July war. Similarly, unlike in 2006, the new cease-fire arrangement has put Hezbollah in a bind by making Israel, which has yet to withdraw fully from Lebanon, a de facto enforcer in that it can report alleged violations to a US-led monitoring committee and take responsive actions as it deems necessary. Additionally, the scale of devastation in Lebanon — particularly among Hezbollah’s and Amal’s constituents, who suffered the most from the war — has compelled those groups to concede the need for a government trusted by international donors to lead the country’s reconstruction. A preliminary report conducted by the World Bank before the end of the war estimated total losses at more than $8.5 billion with around 100,000 homes damaged or destroyed.

Three lessons to secure a stable day after

The election of a new leadership has presented a historic opportunity for Lebanon, offering three vital lessons for capitalizing on the momentum.

1. Strategic international engagement can shift the balance: The election of Joseph Aoun highlights the power of timely and coordinated international action. Saudi Arabia’s strategic return to Beirut after years of withdrawal and its leverage in conditioning international aid on Aoun’s election proved decisive. The US, France, and Saudi Arabia rallied behind one candidate and dispatched their envoys to deliver an uncompromising message that Aoun’s success was critical to unlocking the international aid needed to rebuild the country and resuscitate its economy. As one Lebanese member of parliament reported, the French envoy stressed it would be “Joseph Aoun or no one,” adding “Aoun is the alternative number 1, 2, 3, 4 ... 10.”

2. Strong leadership over consensus: By not playing along with Hezbollah’s stalling tactics in the premiership vote, Aoun’s simple adherence to the voting schedule signaled that Lebanon’s institutions need not bend to Hezbollah’s exceptionalism. Maintaining this resolve is essential for fostering the momentum needed to build a credible state that can prioritize its pressing governance and security challenges rather than pursue futile consensus with Hezbollah. The momentous challenge of forming a capable government will require determination and international backing to stand up to Hezbollah’s tactics of obstruction and intimidation designed to impose its inclusion in the cabinet. Despite this initial promise, the limited transparency and delays over the government formation process — particularly with regard to whether it would pursue the path of consensus with Hezbollah or form a cabinet capable of driving the reforms needed to break their grip — are a notable reminder that Lebanon’s new leadership has yet to fulfill that promise.

3. Local agency remains the catalyst for change: While external support proved decisive in the presidential election, the contest over the premiership was won by internal agency made possible by Hezbollah’s waning influence. Reformist and opposition forces showed that when local actors rally around a shared vision — anchored in reform and state-building — they possess the power to reclaim their institutions under the right circumstances. But these seismic shifts have happened with a hung parliament and in the aftermath of a devastating war. With parliamentary elections scheduled for 2026, one final lesson cannot be ignored: action by a majority of reform-oriented representatives committed to Lebanon’s sovereignty is key to ensuring Lebanon’s positive transformation.

The road ahead: Combining local leadership with international support

Now that the leadership vacuum has been filled, the new president and prime minister have pledged to move quickly to form a government that can meet the moment — a goal yet to be fulfilled. Promises that raise expectations but fail to deliver will undermine local and international trust in Lebanon’s potential. In forming a new government, the prime minister must demonstrate a willingness to avoid Lebanon’s dysfunctional business as usual that invites all parties to jockey over different ministries and competing influence at the expense of the national interest. Consensus with bad-faith actors has failed Lebanon for decades. Instead, Beirut must form a competent and capable government that can fulfill three key priorities — reassert the state’s control, oversee an inclusive and transparent reconstruction of war-afflicted areas, and implement the profound reforms needed to resuscitate Lebanon’s collapsing economy. While the influence of Hezbollah and Iran has been weakened, their ability to derail Lebanon’s effort to reestablish a credible state should not be underestimated. Decisive international backing is key to neutralizing spoilers and empowering Lebanon’s leadership to take the risks needed to step up and form an effective government. But these are decisions only the Lebanese can and need to make if they are to secure a future away from endless conflict, economic ruin, and state failure.

Restore the state’s full authority

First, the president, prime minister, and new cabinet must be united in a firm conviction to uphold and fully implement the recently extended cease-fire deal and the government of Lebanon’s longstanding and long-neglected obligations to assert its full control over all of its territory and secure its borders according to UN resolutions. The new government must not repeat the failures of its predecessors by sidestepping the issue of Hezbollah’s arms and its incompatibility with the establishment of a legitimate Lebanese state. If Lebanon is to emerge from this war as a credible state, it needs to tackle the structural dysfunctions that thrust Lebanon into a conflict it could not afford and its people did not want.

In his presidential oath, Aoun vowed that the state will have a monopoly on force and return to “positive neutrality,” effectively pulling Lebanon out of Iran’s sphere of influence. Although the prime minister pushed back against claims that his election excluded anyone from belonging to the Lebanese state, he also made clear that the state must extend its sole authority over its territory.

In the post-war landscape, the strategic objective of Hezbollah’s disarmament appears to be within reach. Hezbollah has lost not only its war with Israel but also the war in Syria and the better part of its arsenal — a substantial material loss that may never be recovered. On an organizational level, its founding leaders were systematically eliminated and its reputation deflated; the organization now faces the daunting challenge of having to justify these losses — without its most experienced and charismatic personalities — to constituents who have paid the price of war. For a long time, Hezbollah’s leverage came from claiming domestically that it could deter against Israeli attacks on Lebanon as well as from the fact that its Iranian patron saw the group as a key part of its forward defense doctrine against Israel. The 2024 war shattered Hezbollah’s ability to do either. Making matters worse, the new de facto enforcement mechanism and continued Israeli presence in South Lebanon are pressing Hezbollah to reluctantly concede the loss of its strategic military infrastructure in the south. Following these critical setbacks, Hezbollah will face immense pressure to concede its remaining arsenal outside that buffer zone, between the Litani River and the Blue Line; that pressure will come not only from Beirut but also, if Washington plays its cards right, Tehran.

To capitalize on the momentum fostered by these setbacks, Washington must maintain consistent pressure on Tehran to thwart any attempts to restore Hezbollah’s capabilities. Following the cease-fire agreements in Gaza and Beirut, Israel and the administration of newly inaugurated President Donald Trump appear to be shifting the regional tug of war with Tehran from the proxy to the state level. Iran’s acute vulnerabilities — including the reality that funding Hezbollah puts additional strain on its sanctioned economy and accentuates, rather than alleviates, risks to its national security — combined with Hezbollah’s failure to deter Israel, can push Tehran to move away from its forward defense doctrine. Washington must maintain pressure on Tehran to concede that Hezbollah’s disarmament is an unavoidable loss over which it is not worth jeopardizing the survival of the Iranian regime.

In tandem, Washington should support Lebanon’s new leadership and the LAF — in particular, through a combination of targeted intelligence, financial resources, and visible political support — on the condition that they move to implement the cease-fire and secure the south. Washington seemed to be moving in this direction, having recently announced more than $100 million in additional support for the Lebanese forces. But the broad freeze in US foreign aid imposed by the Trump administration in late January creates uncertainty around the potential implications for US support for the LAF. Washington’s new leadership has made clear that any such assistance must explicitly align with US interests. Failure by Lebanon’s new government and the LAF to fulfill its responsibilities or the perception of decisively conceding to Hezbollah in the government formation process would risk undermining that critical support.

The deployment of the LAF across southern Lebanon is instrumental to building its legitimacy and countering Hezbollah’s narrative that the state lacks the ability to protect Lebanon, the south, or the Shi’a community. The strengthening of the state’s control over Beirut’s airport throughout the war and the cease-fire process sets an important precedent that should be replicated. Simultaneously, Washington must ensure Israel’s adherence to the terms of the agreement and its complete withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Any lingering occupation of Lebanon would only breathe new life into Hezbollah’s narrative of endless armed resistance and undermine the credibility of a new Lebanese state. In its opening salvo to reassert its influence, to mixed effect, Hezbollah mobilized demonstrations across Lebanon on the cease-fire’s expiration and exploited public rejection of Israel’s presence in Lebanon as well as local residents longing to return to their homes. A high casualty rate, the failure of its narrative to resonate outside its core base, the extension of the cease-fire, and the continued presence of Israeli troops still underscore the shaky ground on which Hezbollah stands.

Still, Hezbollah and Iran’s longstanding ability to absorb setbacks and wait for moments when US attention shifts away to reassert their influence in unexpected ways should not be underestimated. While Hezbollah has in the past resorted to attacks on UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) soldiers, targeted assassinations of political rivals, or even the military takeover of Beirut in 2008, it has done so through a calculated assessment based on Iran’s then-ascending regional agenda and likely limited pushback from a historically reluctant Washington. Making the removal of Lebanon from Iran’s strategic grip a clear and attainable priority can set the stage for a transformative shift.

Transparent and accountable reconstruction

Second, Lebanon needs a capable and visionary government committed to transparent, inclusive, and efficient reconstruction of the country’s south and other areas damaged by the war. This process must prioritize engaging those most affected and fostering their investment in a future where governance is unified under a sovereign state. Reconstruction must go beyond bricks and mortar — it must heal the country’s fragile social fabric, aid the displaced, support refugees, and rebuild trust between citizens and their government. A transparent and people-centric reconstruction process is key to ensuring that war-shattered communities are brought into Lebanon’s state-building initiatives and that humanitarian aid is not lost to corruption or diverted to Hezbollah’s coffers. Hezbollah has brought war and ruin to its constituents and the country more widely. In the coming battle of narratives, the Lebanese state and its partners must be legitimately perceived as being responsible for rebuilding that damage.

Reform, reform, reform

Third, Lebanon needs to revive its economy. Since 2019, despite an International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff-level agreement offering a pathway to recovery, Lebanon’s leadership — entangled in vested interests and beholden to Hezbollah — has deliberately failed to enact the reforms necessary to unlock international aid or stabilize Lebanon’s concurrent crises. The consequences have been catastrophic: a collapsed banking sector, crumbling education and healthcare systems, a currency stripped of its value, and basic services like electricity and clean water increasingly out of reach and controlled by mafias exploiting parallel markets for private generators, solar power, and water tanks.

Implementation of the deep reforms promised by both the new president and prime minister is crucial to restoring the integrity of the state and combatting the systemic corruption that has deprived so many Lebanese not just of their livelihoods but the right to live in dignity. However, these reforms cannot be treated in isolation as purely economic, security related, or governance focused as has often been done in the past. International donors and Lebanon’s new leadership must apply a comprehensive approach and dismantle the parallel structures that have systematically undermined the credibility of public institutions, the rule of law, and state authority.

Curbing pervasive mismanagement and elite capture or restoring the provision of basic services, though vital to reestablishing public trust in governing institutions, are impossible as long as Hezbollah retains the power to impose its will on the Lebanese state. Moreover, Lebanon cannot be fully reintegrated into the region’s political economy or attract back regional and international investors as long as Hezbollah remains armed. Both the governance and economic reforms are necessary to finally encourage the hundreds of thousands of talented Lebanese who have left to potentially return and revitalize their country’s human capital base. But none can be tackled until the Hezbollah issue is resolved. The ongoing lack of transparency over the government formation process continues to deflate the original optimism surrounding the prime minister’s ability to form a capable government that can stand up to Hezbollah and other vested interests. Washington and its partners can play a constructive role by both providing the economic, political, and security reassurances needed for Lebanon’s leadership to resist intimidation from Hezbollah but also, as they did with the election, by making firm that their assistance is conditional on the formation of a government that can stand up to spoilers, not one that includes those beholden to them.

A new Lebanon is possible

Lebanon has long been written off as too dysfunctional to save or forever tethered to Iran’s orbit of influence. However, Hezbollah has lost much more than just its leadership and its arsenal — it has lost the narrative that its rule over Lebanon is inevitable. The collapse of Assad and the death of Hassan Nasrallah — the seemingly unmovable pillars that once determined the Levant’s future — offer a rare moment to reimagine what is possible. Much of the struggle to secure a stable regional landscape will depend on what unfolds in Lebanon, the future of which will be determined by tough choices on the local, regional, and international levels. With a capable leadership emerging in Beirut and Hezbollah and Iran at their nadir, Washington can help neutralize efforts to obstruct Lebanon’s success and give the Lebanese people a fighting chance.

But the optimism surrounding this new leadership must be earned. Having raised the expectations of its people and cautious international partners, it must now deliver. With the Lebanese rallying behind them, this momentum to establish a reliable partner in the Lebanese state cannot be lost. It is an inflection point that, if seized, would ensure that Lebanon can stand on its own and contribute to a stable regional order.

A reimagined Lebanon, sovereign and accountable, would herald the rebirth of the Levant as a space for progress, pluralism, and reform — a powerful rejection of Iran’s vision of constant war and state failure. Such a transformation would not only close one of the region’s darkest chapters but also light a new path forward — one in which states are accountable to their people. Much like the United States’ own experiment with democracy, it is the promise of Lebanon and what it can be that has been its most valuable, if underappreciated, asset. Now is the time to fulfill that promise and ensure Lebanon’s story is one defined by a politics of hope — the only antidote that can defeat the Iranian regime’s narrative of endless despair.

 

Fadi Nicholas Nassar is the US-Lebanon Fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC, and an assistant professor in political science and international affairs and director of the Institute for Social Justice and Conflict Resolution at the Lebanese American University.

Photo by ANWAR AMRO/AFP via Getty Images